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Abstract—Community detection, aiming to group nodes based on their connections, plays an important role in network analysis,
since communities, treated as meta-nodes, allow us to create a large-scale map of a network to simplify its analysis. However, for
privacy reasons, we may want to prevent communities from being discovered in certain cases, leading to the topics on community
deception. In this paper, we formalize this community detection attack problem in three scales, including global attack (macroscale),
target community attack (mesoscale) and target node attack (microscale). We treat this as an optimization problem and further propose
a novel Evolutionary Perturbation Attack (EPA) method, where we generate adversarial networks to realize the community detection
attack. Numerical experiments validate that our EPA can successfully attack network community algorithms in all three scales, i.e., hide
target nodes or communities and further disturb the community structure of the whole network by only changing a small fraction of
links. By comparison, our EPA behaves better than a number of baseline attack methods on six synthetic networks and three real-world
networks. More interestingly, although our EPA is based on the louvain algorithm, it is also effective on attacking other community
detection algorithms, validating its good transferability.
Index Terms—Social network, community detection, community deception, privacy protection, genetic algorithm.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
NATURAL network consists of many nodes and links,which captures certain relationship in real world and
is often used as a mathematical representation for a variety
of complex systems, such as social systems [1]–[4], trans-
portation systems [5], [6] and supply chain systems [7],
[8], etc. Many real-world networks can be divided into
communities, with the nodes within the same communities
connected densely, while those across different communities
connected sparsely [9]. The revealed community structure
can not only present the close relationship among the nodes
inside a certain community, but may also indicate that these
nodes tend to share common properties or play similar
roles in the respective fields [10]. Analyzing community
structure in a network thus can help to better understand
the interactions inter- and intra- close groups of nodes in
the network, which is the exact reason why new community
detection algorithms are continuously proposed and widely
used in a large number of areas.
Community detection algorithms are designed to di-
vide the network into partitions of dense regions which
correspond to strong related entities. Evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of these algorithms has been a controversial
problem until Newman proposed the modularity Q [11],
[12]. The proposal of modularity makes the problem of
non-overlapping community detection unprecedented de-
veloped. A bunch of modularity optimization algorithms
were subsequently proposed, some of which are based on
splitting or aggregation [13]–[16], while many others use
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optimization algorithms to maximizes the modular Q, such
as annealing [17], Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [18],
external optimization [19] and spectral optimization [20].
These algorithms translate community detection into an op-
timization problem and try to find the optimal community
division by maximizing certain fitness. In addition, there are
also community detection algorithms based on information
theory [21]–[24] and label propagation [25]–[27]. The former
believes that data flow can be compressed with regular code,
such as random walk model. The main idea is that the
probability of wandering to the nodes in the same group
is much greater than those in different groups; while the
latter updates each node label to its most frequent neighbor
label through iteration, which was widely used due to its
simplicity and high efficiency.
However, on one hand, people may not want their social
information, such as communities, as a part of privacy to be
discovered by certain algorithms; on the other hand, a lot of
graph-based models, e.g., graph-based recommenders, need
to integrate community detection to improve their efficiency,
especially for those relatively large systems. The normal
operation of such systems thus may rely on the robustness of
community detection algorithm. These bring up a problem:
how to attack community detection algorithms or defense
against such attacks? Since different links play different
roles in keeping the community structure of a network,
the community detection algorithms could be significantly
disturbed by only changing a small fraction of links. In this
paper, we focus on the attack part, and seek the maximum
community change by rewiring minimal number of links,
which can help to judge which links are most vulnerable
and thus also provides insights for the defense part in order
to keep the community structure.
There are some attack strategies to disturb network
algorithms [31]–[34], but few studies related to community
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2TABLE 1: Comparison with the existent approaches.
Approach Scale of Attack Way to Change Network Budget Required
Nagaraja [28] Mesoscale Addition Yes
Waniek et al. [29] Mesoscale Rewiring Yes
Fionda et al. [30] Mesoscale Rewiring Yes
Our EPA Macroscale & Mesoscale & Microscale Rewiring & Addition No
detection attack. Nagaraja [28] first introduced a community
hiding problem, where they added links based on centrality
values. Waniek et al. [29] proposed a heuristic rewiring
method to hide a community, by deleting the links within
the same communities while adding the links across dif-
ferent communities. Because the links are random selected,
the method is of relatively low effectiveness. And they also
propose the concept of individual hiding, as a way to avoid
an influential node being highlighted by three centrality
measures (i.e., degree, closeness, betweenness). Valeria et
al. [30] proposed a deception score to evaluate the effect
of community deception, which takes the accuracy and
recall of community detection into account, as well as the
reachability of target community. The essence of this score
is that the target community is expected to be divided into
more new communities and each new community contains
less percentage of target nodes. However, this may lead
to the following two problems: first, it encourages more
communities which might make the attack less concealed;
second, when the number of communities is set to be
constant, it can’t guide the nodes from the target community
to the optimal community to achieve better attack capacity.
Quite recently, Chen et al. [35] proposed Q-Attack based on
Genetic Algorithm (GA) and modularity, for the first time,
to disturb the overall modular structure of a network.
Generally, we think there are following three types of
community detection attacks of different scales.
• Global attack (macroscale): This attack is to achieve
maximum community changes of the whole network
by rewiring minimal number of links.
• Target community attack (mesoscale): This attack is
also known as community deception, which is to hide
one specific community by rewiring minimal number
of links that are connected to at least one node in the
community.
• Target node attack (microscale): This attack is to
make target node belong to different communities by
rewiring the minimal number of links around it. Note
that our target node attack is different from the indi-
vidual hiding proposed by Waniek et al. [29], since the
latter has nothing to do with community detection.
In this paper, we formalize the community detection
attack problem and present an Evolutionary Perturbation
Attack (EPA) algorithm to attack community detection algo-
rithms in three scales, i.e., macroscale (network), mesoscale
(community) and microscale (node). The main differences
between our method and the previous attack algorithms
are summarized in TABLE 1. Moreover, we use a series of
metrics to evaluate the attack results obtained by different
attack methods on several real datasets. In particular, we
make the following main contributions.
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to
formalize the problem of community detection attack
into three scales, i.e., macroscale (network), mesoscale
(community) and microscale (node).
• We propose a novel EPA algorithm to attack community
detection, which is capable of generating approximate
optimal adversarial network with the minimal number
of rewired links to launch all the three scales of at-
tacks. We compare our EPA with other baseline attack
methods on several synthetic networks and real-world
networks, and find that EPA behaves the best in most
cases, achieving the state-of-the-art results.
• We use GA to solve the optimization problem in EPA
algorithm, and meanwhile introduce network struc-
tural properties including betweenness and the shortest
path lengths between pairwise nodes into the mutation
process to accelerate the convergence rate, making it
faster to obtain the approximate optimal solution.
• We find that our EPA has outstanding transferability,
i.e., the adversarial network generated by EPA against
the louvain algorithm (LOU) can also be used to suc-
cessfully fool other community detection algorithms.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we
formalize the problem of community detection attack and
introduce our EPA method in details. Then, we compare the
attack effects by utilizing EPA and other attack methods on
a number of synthetic networks and real-world networks
in Sec. 3, where we further use a variety of community
detection algorithms to verify the transferability of EPA.
Finally, we conclude the paper and highlight future research
directions in Sec. 4.
2 COMMUNITY DETECTION ATTACK
2.1 Problem Formulation
First, we state and formalize the problem of community
detection attack. Given a network G=(V, E) as an undirected
graph including a set of nodes V and a set of links E, sup-
pose it can be divided into communities C={C1,C2, · · · ,Cp},
with Ci ⊆ V and Ci ∩ Cj=∅, for all i,j ∈ {1, 2, · · · , p} and
i 6= j. Then, we propose the concept of community detection
attack, which is launched by adversarial network to fool
community detection methods. We study this problem in
three scales: global attack (macroscale), target community
attacks (mesoscale) and target node attack (microscale).
Definition 1 (Adversarial network). Denoting the original
network G=(V, E) as the target, the adversarial attack
selects some key links to construct an adversarial pertur-
bation network Gˆ=(V, Eˆ,ω), where ωuv ∈ {−1, 0, 1} is
the weight on the Eˆuv. Adversarial network G¯=(V, E¯),
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Fig. 1: The framework of EPA, which consists of four steps. First, an original network is input to EPA. Second, GA is used
to generate the approximate optimal network change, denoted by the sets of added and deleted links. Third, an adversarial
network is established by changing the links in the original network. Finally, various community detection algorithms are
performed on the adversarial network to validate the attack effect of EPA.
generated by adding adversarial perturbation on the
original network, is defined as
E¯uv = Euv +ωuvEˆuv. (1)
Problem 1 (Global Attack). Given a network G=(V, E),
generate an adversarial network G¯=(V, E¯) via at-
tack strategy to make community detection method
ϕ fail with budget β. G¯ is divided into communities
C¯={C¯1, C¯2, · · · , C¯q} by using the same community de-
tection algorithm. Furthermore, E+ (resp., E−) denotes
a set of link additions (resp., deletions) and the global
attack is realized by solving the optimization problem:
arg max {φ(C, C¯, E, E¯, E+, E−, β)}, (2)
where β = |E+| = |E−|, meaning that we only consider
the rewiring operation for global attack, and E¯ = (E ∪
E+)\E−. Since the links are rewired globally, we have
E+ ⊆ {(u, v) : u ∈ V ∧ v ∈ V, (u, v) /∈ E}, (3)
E− ⊆ {(u, v) : u ∈ V ∧ v ∈ V, (u, v) ∈ E}. (4)
Problem 2 (Target Community Attack). Given a target com-
munity Ci ⊆ C, which is obtained by community detec-
tion method ϕ on the original network G. After target
community attack, Ci cannot be detected by ϕ, i.e., in the
adversarial network G¯, the nodes in Ci belong to a set of
new communities, denoted by C˙={C˙1, C˙2, · · · , C˙r} ⊆ C¯,
with C˙j ∩ Ci 6= ∅, ∀j ∈ [1, r], which is realized by solving
the optimization problem:
arg max {φ(Ci, C˙, E, E¯, E+, E−, β)}. (5)
Here, we still consider the rewiring process and thus
have β = |E+| = |E−|, E¯ = (E ∪ E+)\E−. In order
to hide community Ci, it would be best to disconnect
the links inside the community while add connections
between the nodes in Ci and those in other communities,
thus we have
E+ ⊆ {(u, v) : u ∈ Ci ⊕ v ∈ Ci, (u, v) /∈ E}, (6)
E− ⊆ {(u, v) : u ∈ Ci ∧ v ∈ Ci, (u, v) ∈ E}. (7)
Problem 3 (Target Node Attack). Given a target node t,
suppose it belongs to community Ci in the original
network G, while it belongs to C¯j in the adversarial
network G¯, then the target node attack is realized by
solving the optimization problem:
arg max {δ× µ(E, E¯, E+, E−, β)}, (8)
δ =
 1 |
C¯j∩Ci|
|C¯j| <e
0 else
, (9)
where µ is the function to measure the amount of
network change. e ∈ [0, 1] is a predefined threshold,
based on which we determine whether communities Ci
and C¯j are close to each other or not. We think the
attack is successful only when these two communities
are relatively different from each other. Similarly , we
still have β = |E+| = |E−| and E¯ = (E ∪ E+)\E−. To
make the attack more effective, at this time, we rewire
links around the target node t, thus we have
E+ ⊆ {(u, t) : u ∈ V, (u, t) /∈ E}, (10)
E− ⊆ {(u, t) : u ∈ V, (u, t) ∈ E}. (11)
4TABLE 2: The definitions of main symbols.
Symbol Definition
n The number of nodes in network
m/mt The number of links in network/target community
β The budget which is the number of rewired links
θ The maximum number of rewired links
C/C¯ The communities before/after the attack
M The confusion matrix whose element is mi,j
Mi./M.i The number of nodes in new/original community Ci
mi,j/m˜i,j
The number of community Ci’s nodes which originally
belong/not belong to the target community Cj
EMr /EMc The entropy of new/target communities
Na/Nb The number of communities in the control/test group
Oi The i-th chromosome of the population
(.)|Oi The value under the attack represented by Oi
The function φ in Eqs. (2) and (5) is used to evaluate the
attack gain, which will be specialized in Sec. 2.3. Note that
the attack gain consists of two parts: the budget β, defined
as the number of rewired links, and the attack effect. As we
can see, the overall attack effect generally increases as the
budget β grows, as a result, it is our focus to improve the
attack gain with only limited budget β.
These indicate that community detection attack can al-
ways be represented as an optimization problem, which
could be well solved by evolutionary computing methods,
such as Genetic Algorithm (GA). In this paper, we pro-
pose a GA based Evolutionary Perturbation Attack (EPA)
for community detection. In order to make the GA more
suitable for finding appropriate attack strategy, we use
rewired link ID as genes on the chromosome instead of
binary coding, which can effectively reduce the storage
space of the population. Considering that the number of
rewired links is also a variable here, we adopt a strategy
called unequal crossover to make the length of chromosome
changeable during the crossover process. Moreover, a novel
search mechanism based on network structural properties,
including betweenness and the shortest path lengths be-
tween pairwise nodes, is introduced in the mutation process
to accelerate the convergence of GA, making it faster to
obtain the approximate optimal solution.
In particular, our EPA is established in four stages,
including initialization, evaluation, crossover and mutation,
which will be introduced one by one in the following. The
flowchart of EPA is shown in Fig. 1, and the main symbols
used in this paper are listed in TABLE 2 for convenience.
2.2 Initialization
First, we directly use the ID of rewired link as the gene of
chromosome to facilitate the evolving. Specifically, we create
the indexes for existent links and nonexistent links and
treat them as link deletion and addition genes, respectively.
To make the attack more concealed, we set the number
of deleted links equal to that of added links, so that the
total number of links in the network keeps constant. Denote
the threshold of the number of rewired links by θ and the
chromosome by Oi with the budget β ∈ [1, θ]. We thus have
Oi = {Ai, Bi}
= {a1i , a2i , · · · , aβi , b1i , b2i , · · · , b
β
i }, (12)
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Fig. 2: An illustration of chromosome encoding and ini-
tialization. G¯|Oi is the adversarial network after the attack
represented by chromosome Oi. The original network G
contains 14 links and 52 disconnected pairs of nodes that
have potential to be connected in the attack. The red dashed
lines and the green solid lines represent the links that are
deleted and added in the attack, respectively. In the left,
the rectangles represent the link addition genes while the
triangles denote the link deletion genes. Then, we initialize
chromosome Oi by randomly selecting β = 4 link addition
and deletion genes, respectively.
where Oi, with the index i ∈ [1, P], represents the i-th
chromosome in population and P is the population size
of GA. Ai and Bi represent the sets of link addition and
deletion links, respectively, in chromosome Oi, with the
element aki (or b
k
i ) being the index of a node pair which are
disconnected (or connected). The link change ωuv between
two nodes u and v, represented by chromosome Oi, is thus
calculated by
ωuv =

1 Index(u, v) ∈ Ai
−1 Index(u, v) ∈ Bi
0 otherwise
, (13)
where Index(u, v) is the function to obtain the index of a
node pair (u, v). An illustration to explain how chromo-
somes are coded and initialized is shown in Fig. 2.
Note that, to make the target node attack more effec-
tively, instead of initializing randomly, we first select a
target community randomly, then we preferentially delete
the links between the target node and those not belonging
to the target community, while establish links between the
target node and those in the target community. If all nodes in
the target community are connected to the target node, then
we randomly select another target community and repeat
the above steps.
52.3 Evaluation
2.3.1 Fitness Function
Each chromosome corresponds to an attack strategy. After
encoding the attack strategies, we then need to evaluate the
attack effect of each strategy using some fitness function.
Note that the entropy is maximized when each new com-
munity consists of nodes uniformly from many different real
communities. Since the uniform distribution emphasized by
entropy makes the overall accuracy and recall as low as
possible, we thus think it’s an appropriate metric to evaluate
the attack effect. For the global attack or target community
attack, their fitness functions follow the same general form,
represented by
φi = Ψ(d′|Oi)× X(C, C¯|Oi), (14)
which consists of two parts: the attenuation function Ψ ∈
[0, 1] and the attack effect evaluation function X. Ψ is a
monotonic decreasing function of d′|Oi, with d′ being the
normalization of d which represents the degree change after
the attack represented by chromosome Oi. X is the function
to evaluate the attack effect based on entropy, and the terms
C and C¯|Oi denote the community detection results before
and after the attack, respectively. For the target node attack,
however, since the attack effect is binary, i.e., either success
or failure, the fitness function only contains the first part,
i.e., the change of target node degree.
2.3.2 Attenuation Function
In order to perform the attack with limited budget β, we use
the exponential decay function as our attenuation function,
described as follows:
Ψ(d′|Oi) = exp(c× d′)|Oi, (15)
where d′ = d/m (m is the number of links in the whole
network) for global attack while d′ = d/mt (mt is the num-
ber of links in the target community) for target community
attack; and c is a constant that controls the decay speed.
For a network of n nodes, the degrees of all nodes be-
fore and after the attack are denoted by D={d1, d2, · · · , dn}
and D¯={d¯1, d¯2, · · · , d¯n}, respectively. Then, the distance d
between them is calculated by
d =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
∣∣di − d¯i∣∣ , (16)
where di and d¯i are the degrees of node i before and after
the attack, respectively. Note that when adding and deleting
links on totally different nodes, the degree distance d tends
to be equal to the number of rewired links divided by the
number of nodes. However, if we delete a link around a
node whenever we add a link to it, its degree will not
change, and thus the degree distance must be equal to 0
all the time. In this study, the latter is considered more
concealed and thus is preferred according to Eq. (15).
2.3.3 Attack Effect
Given a confusion matrix M with each element mij repre-
senting the number of the shared nodes between the original
community Ci and the new community C¯j, we define the
function X to evaluate the attack effect:
X(C, C¯|Oi) = (E′Mr + E′Mc )|Oi, (17)
where E′Mr and E
′
Mc are the normalized entropy of Mr and
Mc, and thus X must be in the range of [0, 2]. Suppose EMr
and EMc are the entropy of new communities and target
communities, which are obtained by considering the row
vectors and column vectors of M, respectively. Suppose the
matrix M dimension is Na × Nb, with Na and Nb being the
numbers of communities in control group (i.e., real com-
munity number) and test group (i.e., community number
detected by certain community detection algorithm after
the attack), respectively, the maximum values of EMr (resp.,
EMc ) EMc are obtained when the values of each row (resp.,
column) are equal. In this case, the calculation of EMr and
EMc is simplified to
max EMr = −
Na
∑
i=1
Mi.
n
(
1
Nb
log2
1
Nb
× Nb) = log2 Nb, (18)
max EMc = −
Nb
∑
i=1
M.i
n
(
1
Na
log2
1
Na
× Na) = log2 Na, (19)
where n is the number of nodes in network. Mi. and M.i rep-
resent the numbers of nodes in new and original community
Ci, respectively.
For global attack, the entropy for new communities EMr
and that for target communities EMc are calculated by
EMr = −
Na
∑
i=1
Nb
∑
j=1
Mi.
n
(
mi,j
Mi.
log2
mi,j
Mi.
), (20)
EMc = −
Nb
∑
i=1
Na
∑
j=1
M.i
n
(
mj,i
M.i
log2
mj,i
M.i
), (21)
where mij is the number of nodes in new community Ci that
originally belong to community Cj.
Suppose all the communities keep exactly the same after
the attack, we have EMr = EMc = 0. With Eq. (18) we
can conclude that EMr and EMc must be in the range of
[0, log2 Nb] and [0, log2 Na], respectively. Therefore, based on
Eq. (14) and Eq. (17), the fitness of Oi for global attack is
defined as
φi = Ψ(d′|Oi)× ( EMrlog2 Nb
+
EMc
log2 Na
)|Oi. (22)
For target community attack, here we limit that any
added or deleted link must be connected to at least one
node in the target community, which greatly reduces the
searching space of solutions. In this case, M is an Na × 2
matrix with element mij (resp., m˜i,j) being the number of
nodes in community Ci that originally belong (resp., don’t
belong) to target community Cj. For target community Cj,
EMr and EMc are defined as
EMr = −
Na
∑
i=1
Mi.
n
(
mi,j
Mi.
log2
mi,j
Mi.
+
m˜i,j
Mi.
log2
m˜i,j
Mi.
), (23)
EMc = −
Na
∑
i=1
mi,j
M.i
log2
mi,j
M.i
. (24)
Based on the above definitions, we always have m˜i,j=Mi. −
mi,j. The remaining variables are defined the same as those
in Eq. (20) and Eq. (21).
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Fig. 3: An example of non-equal crossover operation. Oi and Oj (resp., O¯i and O¯j) are the chromosomes before (resp., after)
the crossover. liA and l
i
B (resp. l
j
A and l
j
B) are the numbers of exchangeable addition and deletion genes, respectively, on
chromosome Oi (resp. Oj). Furthermore, ri and rj are the numbers of crossed genes in Oi and Oj, respectively.
Similarly, with Eq. (18) we can conclude that EMr and
EMc must be in the range of [0, 1] and [0, log2 Na], respec-
tively. Therefore, the fitness of Oi for target community
attack is defined as
φi = Ψ(d′)× (EMr +
EMc
log2 Na
). (25)
It should be noted that our fitness function based on entropy
is somewhat similar to the deception score H mentioned in
[30], i.e., both of them have a tendency to spread more nodes
of the target community into more communities. The main
difference is that by using normalization, in our method, the
number of new communities will not be too large, making
the attack more concealed.
Finally, for target node attack, it is quite easy to hide a
node by rewiring links. In this study, however, we try to
hide a node by only adding links to the target node. We
believe that adding, rather than deleting, certain links are
much more convenient for social network users. For target
node t, the fitness of chromosome Oi thus is calculated by
φi =
{
dt
dt+β|Oi successful attack
0 otherwise
, (26)
where dt is the degree of target node t before the attack and
β|Oi is the length of chromosome Oi. Thus, dt + β|Oi is the
degree of the target node after the attack represented by Oi.
For any kind of attack, after evaluating each individual
in GA, we further use roulette selection method to select
offspring. If the fitness of each individual in the population
is φi (i = 1, 2, · · · , M) and the size of the population is M,
the selection probability of individual Oi is calculated by
P(Oi) =
φi
∑Mj=1 φj
. (27)
2.4 Crossover
Traditionally, the length of chromosomes is set the same and
is fixed throughout the evolution in GA. Here, we prefer to
use non-equal crossover, where the length of chromosomes
can change in the process of crossover, so that we can find
the optimal solution with the smallest budget β, which is
described by the following steps.
1) Choose two chromosomes Oi and Oj and form two
subsets Ei={AEi , BEi } ⊆ Oi and Ej={AEj , BEj } ⊆ Oj by
removing the identical elements that are considered
nonexchangeable, where AEi (or A
E
j ) and B
E
i (or B
E
j )
are the exchangeable gene sets of addition and deletion,
respectively, in chromosomes Oi (or Oj).
2) Calculate the lengths of AEi , B
E
i , A
E
j and B
E
j , and denote
them by liA, l
i
B, l
j
A and l
j
B, respectively.
3) Generate two random integers ri and rj in the intervals
[1,min(liA, l
i
B)] and [1,min(l
j
A, l
j
B)], respectively.
4) Suppose the numbers of rewired links by chromosomes
Oi and Oj are βi and β j, respectively, and the threshold
is θ. If βi − ri + rj or β j + ri − rj /∈ [1, θ], go to step 3);
otherwise, go to step 5).
5) select ri addition and deletion genes, respectively, from
Oi, and select rj addition and deletion genes, respec-
tively, from Oj; exchange the genes selected from Oi
with those selected from Oj, to generate two new chro-
mosomes O¯1 and O¯2.
The whole process of crossover is shown in Fig. 3.
2.5 Mutation
Here, we further utilize the structural information around
pairwise nodes as heuristic information to accelerate the
searching process of GA.
For link addition, two nodes are of less similarity if the
network distance (or the shortest path length) between them
is relatively long. Therefore, in order to make the attack
more effective, it is better to add the links between pairwise
nodes of longer distance. Suppose the distance between a
pair of disconnected nodes i and j is λij, then the probability
that a link addition gene to create a link between these two
nodes is generated by mutation is defined as
P(ak) =
λij
∑(i,j)/∈E λij
, (28)
7where ak is the index of the pair of nodes (i, j).
For link deletion, the links inside communities always
have lower betweenness than those across different commu-
nities. Therefore, in order to make the attack more effective,
it is better to delete the links of lower betweenness. Given a
link with its index bk, its betweenness is calculated by
CB(bk) = ∑
s,t∈V
σ(s, t|bk)
σ(s, t)
, (29)
where V is the node set in the network, σ(s, t) represents the
total number of shortest paths between nodes s and t, and
σ(s, t|bk) represents the number of shortest paths through
the link. Then, the probability that a link deletion gene to
remove the link is generated by mutation is defined as
P(bk) =
1
CB(bk)
∑mk=1
1
CB(bk)
, (30)
where m is the total number of links in the network.
3 EXPERIMENTS
In this part, we will perform the three kinds of attacks
on several synthetic networks and real-world networks.
For global attack, we first compare our EPA with three
heuristic algorithms under different budges β, and we also
design the experiment to show the ability of EPA to find
the optimal budget. For target community attack, we first
use EPA to get the optimal budget and then compare EPA
with the other algorithms under this budget. For target node
attack, we select some representative nodes as targets. For
each experiment, we run 10 times and record the mean
result. Our experimental environment consists of i7-8700
3.2GHz (CPU), GTX 1050Ti 4GB (GPU), 16GB memory and
Windows 10.
3.1 Datasets
To evaluate the attack effect of EPA, we use three commu-
nity detection algorithms, i.e., greedy (GRE) [13], Infomap
Algorithm (INF) [21] and Louvain (LOU) [36], on the six
synthetic networks and three real networks, described as
follows, with their basic properties presented in TABLE 3
and TABLE 4, respectively. The descriptions of parameters
for generating a synthetic network are listed in TABLE 5 for
convenience.
• The synthetic networks [37]: These networks are gen-
erated by LFR benchmark, all of which are undirected
and unweighted networks.
• The USA college football (Football) [14]: This net-
work represents the matches between American foot-
ball teams during the season of 2000.
• email-Eu-core network (Email) [38]: The network rep-
resents the emails between members of a large Euro-
pean research institution.
• Political blogs (Pol.Blogs) [39]: This network repre-
sents the political leaning collected from blog directo-
ries.
In experiments, we only consider undirected networks
and remove the isolated nodes from data sets since they are
meaningless in community detection. The three community
TABLE 3: The basic properties of the six synthetic networks.
Network N k max k µ min c max c
N-1000-µ-0.3 1000 10 50 0.3 50 100
N-1000-µ-0.5 1000 10 50 0.5 50 100
N-3000-µ-0.3 1000 10 50 0.3 100 200
N-3000-µ-0.5 1000 10 50 0.5 100 200
N-5000-µ-0.3 1000 15 100 0.3 100 200
N-5000-µ-0.5 1000 15 100 0.5 100 200
TABLE 4: The basic properties of the three networks.
Network #Nodes #Links #Communities
Football 115 613 12
Email 1005 25571 42
Pol.Books 1490 19090 2
TABLE 5: The meaning of parameters in synthetic networks.
Parameter Meaning
N number of nodes
k average degree
max k maximum degree
µ mixing parameter
min c minimum community size
max c maximum community size
detection algorithms we adopt are also briefly introduced as
follows to make the paper self-contained.
• GRE [13]: Each node is considered as a separate com-
munity initially and the communities are fused in the
direction of maximum increment of modularity Q.
• INF [21]: It’s an information theory based algorithm
which strive to compress the average description length
for a random walk.
• LOU [36]: This is a modularity based algorithm which
can generate a hierarchical community structure by
compressing the communities continuously.
3.2 Baseline Attack Methods
Inspired by various community detection algorithms, we
use the following four heuristic attack methods as the base-
lines for global attack.
• AQ: A GA based method where the modularity Q is
used to design the fitness function [35].
• AS: Rather than using the entropy-based fitness func-
tion, here we use the average of deception score [30] as
the fitness function and the rest is the same as EPA.
• AB: Deleting the links with the highest betweenness
centrality, while adding the links between the nodes
with the longest distance.
• AD: Deleting the links with the largest sum of degrees
of their terminal nodes, while adding the links between
the nodes with the longest distance.
For target community attack, we use the safeness based
deception algorithm Ds [30] and random algorithm Dw [29]
as the baseline attack methods, which can effectively hide
the target community against different community detection
algorithms, and they are briefly introduced as follows.
• Ds: Both link addition and deletion aim to maximize
the safeness of target community defined in [30].
8• Dw: This method randomly adds links inter different
communities while deletes links intra communities.
For target node attack, we propose a heuristic algorithm
Dr which randomly add links between target node and the
nodes in other communities.
3.3 Performance Metrics
In order to verify the effectiveness of our EPA, we compare
it with other baseline attack methods by using a series of
metrics.
For global attack, we use Normalized Mutual Informa-
tion (NMI) and Adjusted Rand Index (ARI) to evaluate the
community detection results. Then, we further evaluate the
attack effects by comparing their values before and after
attacks. In particular, NMI and ARI are defined as
NMI =
−2∑Nai=1 ∑Nbj=1 mij log(
mijn
MiMj
)
∑Nai=1 Mi log(
Mi
n ) +∑
Nb
j=1 Mj log(
Mj
n )
, (31)
ARI =
∑ij (
mij
2 )− [∑i (Mi2 )∑i (
Mj
2 )]/(
n
2)
1
2 [∑i (
Mi
2 ) +∑j (
Mj
2 )]− [∑i (Mi2 )∑j (
Mj
2 )]/(
n
2)
, (32)
where Mi and Mj are the sums over row i and column j,
respectively. Na and Nb are the numbers of communities in
control group (i.e., real community number) and test group
(i.e., community number detected by certain community
detection algorithm), respectively.
For target community attack, in addition to the fitness,
we also use the deception score H [30] to evaluate the attack
effect, which is defined as
H =
[
1− |S(C)| − 1|C| − 1
]
×
[
1
2
(1−max(R) + 1
2
(1− P¯)
]
, (33)
where |S(C)| is the number of connected components in the
subgraph induced by the members in C. P¯ and R are the
mean precision and recall rate, respectively.
For target node attack, we just use the percentage of
target node degree increment in the attack to evaluate the
results.
3.4 Experimental Results
3.4.1 Global Attack
In global attack, we fix the budget and rewire k% of links to
compare our EPA with four baseline methods including AQ,
AS, AB and AD. We choose LOU as the basic community
detection algorithm, and meanwhile we also use the GRE
and INF algorithms to verify the black-box attack effect. The
population used in the experiment is 100, the maximum
number of iterations is 200, the crossover and mutation
rates are 0.6 and 0.1, respectively. TABLE 6 represents the
community detection results before attack.
The community detection results, in terms of NMI and
ARI, on different datasets obtained by various community
detection algorithms, after the attacks by EPA and the four
baseline attack methods for various percentages of rewired
links, are presented in Fig. 4. Generally, we can find that, our
EPA has the best attack effect on each performance metric,
i.e., leading to smaller NMI and ARI, in most cases.
TABLE 6: The community detection results before attack.
Network
GRE INF LOU
NMI ARI NMI ARI NMI ARI
Football 0.73 0.49 0.92 0.90 0.73 0.49
Email 0.45 0.16 0.68 0.30 0.58 0.33
Pol.Blog 0.69 0.79 0.52 0.65 0.64 0.77
N-1000-µ-0.3 0.73 0.54 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.98
N-1000-µ-0.5 0.37 0.19 0.78 0.70 0.85 0.74
N-3000-µ-0.3 0.63 0.34 0.96 0.96 1.0 1.0
N-3000-µ-0.5 0.28 0.14 0.71 0.56 0.57 0.41
N-5000-µ-0.3 0.75 0.44 1.00 1.00 1.0 1.0
N-5000-µ-0.5 0.42 0.15 0.95 0.93 0.98 0.95
More specifically, we find that EPA performs especially
well on Pol.Blogs network, i.e., rewiring 4% links can de-
crease both NMI and ARI to near 0.3. This may be because
LOU performs quite well in revealing the community struc-
ture of this network, and meanwhile this network is also
easy to be disturbed since the connections are much sparse.
In fact, none of the attack methods performs well on LFR
generated networks with small mixing parameter, i.e., NMI
and ARI still keep relatively high after any kind of attack,
since the communities of these networks are relatively dense
and thus are easier to be detected. Indeed, for larger mixing
parameter, all attacks behave better, leading to smaller NMI
and ARI. By comparison, EPA outperforms all the others
on synthetic networks, no matter for large or small mixing
parameters. Besides, we can also find that white-box attack
(LOU) behaves better than black-box attacks (GRE and INF),
which is quite intuitive since all the attack methods here
are based on the LOU algorithm. More interestingly, by
comparison, the communities detected by INF are relatively
robust than those detected by GRE, under the attack of
LOU based EPA. This may be because both GRE and LOU
are modularity-based algorithms, while INF is based on
information theory.
Now, let’s focus on the influence of the attenuation factor
c which controls the degree that the budget β penalizes the
fitness and ultimately controls the optimal budget generate
by EPA. We thus compare the attack results under different
values of c, and fix the other parameters. For each value,
we run the experiment 10 times and report the mean results
in TABLE 7, where we can see that as c increases from 3 to
6, the final budget generated by EPA significantly decreases
with a little bit sacrifice of attack effects, i.e., NMI and ARI
increases slightly as c increases. We thus suggest to use
relatively large value of c if we want to get a more concealed
attack, while use relatively small value of c if the optimal
attack effect is pursued.
3.4.2 Target Community Attack
Target community attack is also known as community decep-
tion. As an example, we visualize the attack effect of our
EPA on the Dolphin network using t-SNE algorithm [40],
as shown in Fig. 5. Here, we compare EPA with safeness
based deception algorithm Ds [30] and random algorithm
Dw [29]. In order to make fair comparison, we fix the budget
β for each algorithm, i.e., we first use our EPA to find the
optimal budget and then use it as the input of Ds and Dw.
Again, we record the mean values of fitness and deception
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Fig. 4: The attack effects, reflected by the change of NMI and ARI, obtained by EPA and the four baseline attack methods
by rewiring k% of links, with k varies from 1 to 5, for the three real-world networks and six synthetic networks. Darker
colors represent better attack performances and the best performance of each k is shown in red box.
TABLE 7: The global attack results obtained by EPA under various attenuation factor c.
Network c=3 c=4 c=5 c=6
β NMI ARI β NMI ARI β NMI ARI β NMI ARI
Football 12.8 0.76 0.53 10.6 0.77 0.54 8.6 0.77 0.55 7.8 0.78 0.57
Email 566.6 0.48 0.22 506.4 0.49 0.23 134.5 0.51 0.25 113.7 0.53 0.26
Pol.Blogs 1947.1 0.33 0.35 1690.9 0.34 0.35 1172.8 0.37 0.36 1125.5 0.38 0.39
score H for all detected communities with at least 10 nodes
on each network, as presented in TABLE 8-TABLE 9. Note
that here, for synthetic networks, we only give the results
of INF and LOU algorithms, since GRE is of high time
complexity and thus is quite time-consuming on networks
including more than thousands of nodes, especially we need
to attack each community in a network.
We find that, again, our EPA behaves significantly better,
in terms of much higher fitness and deception score H, than
both Ds and Dw. And such results are quite robust. For
instance, for the Football network, it seems that Ds and Dw
lose their attack effects on INF and LOU, i.e., the values of
Fitness and H are quite small by comparing with those on
GRE, as presented in TABLE 8. However, by using our EPA,
their values still keep relatively large for all the three com-
munity detection algorithms, indicating that EPA is effective
in both white-box and black-box situations. Moreover, it
seems that the synthetic networks with smaller mixing pa-
rameters µ always have lower fitness in the corresponding
cases. The reason may be that the networks of smaller µ tend
10
(a) Before attack (b) After attack
Fig. 5: The t-SNE visualization of community deception
obtained by EPA on Dolphin network. The nodes of same
color belongs to the same community detected by GRE, and
the target community is marked by blue. (a) Before attack;
(b) After attack.
TABLE 8: Deception results on real-world networks.
dataset Alg GRE INF Lou
Fitness H Fitness H Fitness H
Football
EPA 0.31 0.58 0.24 0.41 0.27 0.46
Ds 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.16
Dw 0.08 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.09
Email
EPA 0.34 0.57 0.27 0.45 0.39 0.66
Ds 0.20 0.52 0.03 0.13 0.23 0.54
Dw 0.16 0.44 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.47
Pol.Blogs
EPA 0.19 0.47 0.38 0.58 0.27 0.53
Ds 0.13 0.43 0.09 0.52 0.16 0.42
Dw 0.11 0.40 0.05 0.33 0.15 0.38
TABLE 9: Deception results on synthetic networks.
dataset Alg INF Lou
Fitness H Fitness H
1000-0.3
EPA 0.13 0.51 0.17 0.68
Ds 0.07 0.42 0.07 0.60
Dw 0.02 0.18 0.04 0.55
1000-0.5
EPA 0.16 0.52 0.53 0.80
Ds 0.06 0.36 0.27 0.61
Dw 0.05 0.32 0.26 0.61
3000-0.3
EPA 0.08 0.31 0.13 0.72
Ds 0.05 0.39 0.05 0.68
Dw 0.02 0.23 0.03 0.63
3000-0.5
EPA 0.09 0.48 0.54 0.84
Ds 0.06 0.40 0.25 0.60
Dw 0.05 0.39 0.25 0.60
5000-0.3
EPA 0.03 0.27 0.04 0.51
Ds 0.08 0.54 0.04 0.68
Dw 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.46
5000-0.5
EPA 0.07 0.43 0.17 0.82
Ds 0.05 0.37 0.06 0.70
Dw 0.02 0.26 0.04 0.67
to greater differences between communities, making it more
difficult to hide the target community, i.e., corresponding to
a smaller fitness value, according to Eq. (23).
3.4.3 Target Node Attack
Similarly, for target node attack, we also visualize the attack
effect of our EPA on the Dolphin network using t-SNE
algorithm, as shown in Fig. 6. Here, we focus on attacking
hub and bridge nodes in a network since they are always
Target node
Target node
(a) Before attack (b) After attack
Fig. 6: The t-SNE visualization of target node attack obtained
by EPA on Dolphin network. The target node originally
belongs to the blue community. After the attack, it belongs to
the red community. The communities are detected by GRE.
(a) Before attack; (b) After attack.
TABLE 10: Target node attack on real-world networks.
Network Node GRE INF LOU
EPA Dr EPA Dr EPA Dr
Football
T1 8.3% 186% 183% 367% 33% 658%
T2 9.1% 155% 27% 182% 18% 145%
T3 33% 199% 225% 550% 42% 237%
Email
T1 8.4% 15% 25% 35% 0.3% 0.87%
T2 14% 23% 14% 29% 0.5% 2.31%
T3 18% 32% 32% 61% 5.2% 12%
Pol.Blogs
T1 39% 83% 34% 51% 37% 52%
T2 38% 75% 16% 33% 17% 27%
T3 32% 71% 24% 60% 26% 48%
more important in various applications. In particular, we
first rank the nodes in each network based on their degree
and betweenness, from large to small, respectively. Then, in
addition to selecting the two nodes with the largest degree
and betweenness, respectively, as the target nodes, we also
sum the two orders for each node and choose the top one as
our another target node. We name these three target nodes
as T1,T2 and T3, respectively. Finally, we compare EPA with
the Dr algorithm that randomly adds links between target
nodes and the nodes in different communities.
The percentages of degree increment in the attack for
different strategies are presented in TABLE 10-TABLE 11.
We can find that, in general, EPA performs significantly
better than Dr, in terms of smaller percentage of degree
increment, especially in the football network. Moreover, the
bridge nodes of large betweenness are relatively easy to be
attacked, since the neighbors of bridge nodes are always
distributed in different communities, making them quite
sensitive to link changes. On the contrary, it’s relatively
difficult to hide a node with both high degree and between-
ness, since as hub nodes, a much large number of links
always need to be added to change their communities. Note
that, for real-world networks, based on EPA, the number of
added links is much smaller than the degree of target nodes,
indicating our method performs well in target node attack.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a novel Evolutionary Perturbation
Attack (EPA) method, based on Genetic Algorithm (GA),
to disturb community detection algorithms in three scales,
11
TABLE 11: Target node attack on synthetic networks.
dataset Node INF Lou
EPA Dr EPA Dr
1000-0.3
T1 67% 336% 53% 406%
T2 64% 412% 43% 349%
T3 70% 409% 55% 445%
1000-0.5
T1 43% 385% 53% 227%
T2 46% 320% 22% 58%
T3 29% 265% 28% 117%
3000-0.3
T1 142% 340% 40% 625%
T2 114% 408% 47% 522%
T3 194% 493% 54% 596%
3000-0.5
T1 242% 302% 16% 138%
T2 60% 279% 8% 19%
T3 78% 321% 16% 26%
5000-0.3
T1 126% 625% 264% 1853%
T2 97% 535% 224% 1280%
T3 338% 691% 416% 2261%
5000-0.5
T1 60% 560% 55% 706%
T2 70% 558% 52% 653%
T3 128% 672% 83% 815%
from local to global, by only changing a small fraction
of links. In particular, we design a non-equal crossover
strategy to treat the length of chromosome as a variable
and naturally integrate it into GA; and we also integrate the
network structural information, such as network distance
and betweenness, into the algorithm to guide the search so
as to find the better optimal attack strategy more quickly.
Numerical experiments on six synthetic networks and three
real-world validate the effectiveness and trasferability of
our EPA method on attacking various community detection
algorithms, i.e., by comparing with other attack methods
of different scales, EPA behaves the best in most cases,
achieving the state-of-the-art attack effects.
In the future, we will expand this work in the following
three directions. First, we will propose new network coding
methods and also utilize more network structural properties
to improve the efficiency of EPA; second, we will try to inte-
grate network embedding and deep learning graph models
to improve the attack performance; third, we will do more
experiments on more various networks, and further check
the effectiveness of our EPA on the downstream algorithms
based on community detection, to see the potential influence
of EPA on many real applications.
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